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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1013 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL WOLFE, 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 10-cr-00616-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Harvey Bartle, III 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 9, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 18, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 The government appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting Michael Wolfe‟s motion to suppress.  This case 
arises from a search of Wolfe‟s home by Philadelphia police officers, which resulted in 
his indictment for federal drug and firearms offenses.  Arguing that the warrantless search 
violated the Fourth Amendment, Wolfe successfully moved to suppress the evidence the 
officers took and the statements that he made to them after his arrest.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
 
 A. Facts 
 
On the evening of May 3, 2010, Carol Brown dialed 9-1-1 from her home at 912 
South Orianna Street in Philadelphia and reported that her son, Wolfe, had been shot in 
the hand while he was out on the street.  A police radio call then went out reporting a 
“male shot on the highway.”  Two officers responded within a few minutes and knocked 
on the door to Brown‟s home.  She admitted them and told them that her son had been 
shot.  The officers found Wolfe sitting in a chair in the living room bleeding profusely 
from his hand.  They questioned him about what happened and whether he knew who had 
shot him, and Wolfe responded that he had been shot while he was outside.  Brown, her 
daughter, and a neighbor were present in the home while the officers questioned Wolfe.  
The officers asked Brown whether there were any other individuals in the house, and she 
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told them that there were none.  Within a few minutes, the officers assisted Wolfe, who 
appeared to be fainting, out of the home so that he could receive medical treatment.   
 As the officers were bringing Wolfe out the front door, a supervising officer, 
Sergeant Evans, arrived at the scene.  Evans observed that Wolfe appeared to be in a 
great deal of pain, and he authorized the officers to transport Wolfe to a local hospital.  
He did not, however, communicate with Wolfe, Brown, or the officers about what had 
happened or whether there was cause for concern that someone still in the home was 
injured or might pose a threat.  After Wolfe was taken to the hospital, Evans entered the 
home, accompanied by later arriving officers.  
 As he did so, he observed blood, including a trail of blood that led up the stairs to 
the second floor and ended at the top of the stairway.
1
  Evans and another officer 
followed the blood trail to the second floor and entered a rear bedroom (later revealed to 
be Wolfe‟s), where they saw a clear plastic bag on the bed.  Because he immediately 
believed the bag contained narcotics, Evans secured the property and called the police 
department to request a search warrant.  When the search warrant arrived, the officers 
entered the bedroom and began a full search, finding crack cocaine, marijuana, and a 
firearm.   
                                              
1
 Although Evans testified that he could see blood on the carpet inside the home 
prior to his entry, it is unclear whether he observed the blood through a window, or, if the 
door was open after the responding officers transported Wolfe out of the house.  (See 
App. at 73 (“I could see a lot of blood on the carpeting.  … Seeing that blood I went into 
the property to clear the property.”).)  Evans testified that the blood trail continued to the 
bedroom, but the District Court found that the blood stopped at the top of the stairs.  The 
government does not appeal that factual finding, and we accept it as true.  
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 After Wolfe was released from the hospital, police took him to a police station for 
questioning.  They informed him of Evans‟s search and arrested him.  Wolfe later made 
incriminating statements regarding his ownership of the drugs and the gun, and his intent 
to sell the crack cocaine.   
 B. Procedural Background 
 
Wolfe was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), possession with intent to distribute crack 
cocaine near public housing, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860, possession of marijuana, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug 
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).  Wolfe was also charged as a 
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).   
 Wolfe successfully moved to suppress the drugs and firearm discovered in his 
bedroom and the incriminating statements that he made to the police after his arrest.  The 
District Court determined that the first responding officers faced an emergency situation 
which justified their entry into Brown‟s home.  However, the Court also concluded that, 
after the responding officers escorted Wolfe out of the home, 
there was no immediate or compelling need to insure the safety of the 
officers or anyone else by entering the second floor beyond the top of the 
stairs. ... [T]here was no indication, let alone probable cause for a 
reasonable person to believe, that additional victims existed or that any 
assailant was present inside [the home].   
 
(App. at 8.)  The government filed a timely notice of appeal.   
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II. Discussion
2
 
 
We must determine whether Sergeant Evans violated Wolfe‟s Fourth Amendment 
rights by searching the second floor of his residence without a warrant.  That requires 
first asking whether Evans‟s entry into Wolfe‟s residence was lawful, a matter as to 
which the government bears the burden of proof.
3
  See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 
750 (1984) (“[T]he burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances 
that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home 
entries.”).  The government failed to carry that burden, and, on the facts found by the 
District Court, we are persuaded that suppression was appropriate.  
  “It is a „basic principle of Fourth Amendment law‟ that searches and seizures 
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”  Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 
(1971)).  However, the Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  One of those exceptions is that law enforcement officers may enter and 
search a home under exigent circumstances.  Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 
                                              
2
 We review a District Court‟s  ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error as to 
the underlying factual findings, and we exercise “plenary review of [a] District Court‟s 
application of the law to those facts.”  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 
2002).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  The District Court 
had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
 
3
 The District Court did not expressly decide whether Evans‟s initial entry into the 
home was lawful.  Rather, the court granted the motion to suppress based on its 
conclusion that the search of the second floor was unconstitutional.  However, because 
we may affirm on any ground supported by the record, we begin our analysis by 
examining whether Evans‟s initial entry into the home was lawful.  Johnson v. Orr, 776 
F.2d 75, 83 n.7 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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(2009).  Exigent circumstances have been found, for example, in situations where 
emergency aid is required, see Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), where 
officers are in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, see Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and where there is an imminent risk that evidence will be 
destroyed, see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
Of particular note here, “law enforcement officers may enter a home without a 
warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant 
from imminent injury.”  Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.  However, for the warrantless 
search to be constitutional, there must be “probable cause and such other circumstances 
[as] would cause a reasonable person to believe that the „exigencies of the situation made 
that course imperative.‟”  United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882, 892 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).  In other words, Evans 
must have held “„an objectively reasonable basis for believing‟ ... that „a person within 
[the house was] in need of immediate aid.‟”  Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 548 (quoting Brigham 
City, 547 U.S. at 406; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)); see Good v. 
Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1094 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(“[G]iven the rationale for this very limited exception, the state actors making the search 
must have reason to believe that life or limb is in immediate jeopardy and that the 
intrusion is reasonably necessary to alleviate the threat.”).  “The presence of exigent 
circumstances is a finding of fact, which we review for clear error.”  United States v. 
Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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 The government argues that Evans‟s search was justified under the “exigent 
circumstances” exception because he reasonably believed that additional victims or 
threats existed inside Brown‟s home.  Specifically, the government contends that Evans‟s 
search was “not only reasonable, but manifestly appropriate and necessary,” because he 
observed “a gunshot victim on the first floor of the house, blood throughout the rooms on 
the first floor, and a trail of blood leading to the top of the stairs to the second floor,” and 
that he made those observations “moments after a nearby shootout.”  (Appellant‟s 
Opening Br. at 13-14.)  The difficulty with that argument is that it ignores the evidence of 
record and facts found by the District Court.  The government had to prove that Evans 
had an “objectively reasonable basis” for his belief that additional victims or threats 
existed in Brown‟s home.  The only basis the government asserts is the exigency created 
by the shooting that wounded Wolfe.  But the District Court found as a matter of fact that 
there was no exigency in the home by the time Evans arrived, and, on this record, we 
cannot say that finding is clearly erroneous.   
The record reveals that the following information was available to Evans when he 
arrived at 912 South Orianna Street:  (1) a dispatch report that a “male [was] shot on the 
highway,” (App. at 52); (2) his observation that two officers were escorting Wolfe, who 
was bleeding, out of the house; and (3) his observation – somehow made from outside – 
that there was blood on the carpet in the house.  Importantly, however, Evans arrived at 
the scene after two other officers had already been in the home and addressed the 
exigency, and none of the evidence available to Evans when he arrived suggested that 
there was another victim or threat in the home.  First, the fact that the dispatch reported a 
 8 
 
shooting on the highway does not, on its own, support a reasoned belief that the unknown 
shooter, or another victim, was inside Wolfe‟s home.  Indeed, while the government 
portrays the events as a rapidly unfolding and chaotic scene, the testimony shows that the 
scene was in keeping with the only report available to the police:  there was one victim; 
he was shot on the highway; he returned to his residence, where police officers attended 
to him; and he was leaving his residence for the hospital with those officers.  On these 
facts, and they are the facts that bind our review, Evans‟s observation of blood in the 
house did not create an “objectively reasonable” basis for a belief that the blood belonged 
to anyone other than Wolfe.  There is nothing in the record suggesting that anyone other 
than Wolfe was wounded or had come into the house that Brown shared with Wolfe.  To 
the extent an emergency existed when the two responding officers first arrived at 912 
South Orianna Street, it ceased when they safely transported Wolfe out of the house and 
to the hospital.   
 This last point bears strong emphasis.  We should not be understood as holding 
that police officers cannot address ambiguous and evolving circumstances as their well-
informed professional judgment dictates.  In this case, however, Evans began his search 
after the two responding officers had already resolved the only exigency there was cause 
to believe existed.  It is true that “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of a likely serious, 
life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency aid exception,” Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 549 
(internal quotation marks omitted), but here, after hearing the evidence, the District Court 
determined that Evans had no indication that additional victims or threats were inside the 
home after Wolfe‟s departure.  Though the government disagrees with that interpretation 
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of the evidence, the finding is sufficiently supported to withstand review for clear error.
4
  
(App. at 8.) 
 The government relies heavily on Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), to 
support its position that the search was lawful under the exigent circumstances exception, 
but its reliance is misplaced.  In Mincey, shots were fired inside an apartment during an 
undercover drug operation, and an officer was killed.  Mincey, 437 U.S. at 387.  After the 
shooting, officers quickly searched the apartment for additional victims and discovered 
several wounded occupants.  Id. at 388.  Subsequently, police conducted an extensive, 
warrantless, four-day search of the entire residence.  Id. at 389.  The Supreme Court held 
that although the initial search was constitutional under the emergency aid exception, the 
subsequent four-day search of the house was unlawful.  Id. at 392-93.  The Court 
explained that, 
a warrantless search must be „strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
which justify its initiation,‟ … and it simply cannot be contended that this 
search was justified by any emergency threatening life or limb.  All the 
                                              
4
 The government asserts that, even if Evans had been informed that no other 
victims were present, “he would not simply accept that information, but would act to 
verify it.”  (Appellant‟s Reply Br. at 4; see also App. at 99.)  In other words, the 
government seems to suggest that an officer‟s perceived need to “clear” the premises 
(i.e., conduct a room-to-room search of the entire house to ensure that no other victims or 
threats are present) is enough to satisfy the demands of the Fourth Amendment.  On these 
facts, the government is mistaken.  Although a police officer who arrives at the scene of 
an ongoing emergency may search a residence to ensure that there are no additional 
victims or threats, he must have an “objectively reasonable basis” for doing so.  See 
Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 549 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406) (noting that the test “is 
not what [the officer] believed, but whether there was an objectively reasonable basis for 
believing that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  That basis was lacking here. 
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persons in Mincey‟s apartment had been located before the investigating 
homicide officers arrived there and began their search.  
 
Id. at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)). 
 Mincey does not support the government‟s actions in this case because, unlike 
Mincey, in which the officers knew that the crime causing the exigency occurred inside 
the home, the only information the police had here was that the crime that caused the 
exigency occurred outside the home and that the single victim had retreated inside.  On 
the facts found by the District Court, there was no foundation for inferring that the 
perpetrators were inside the residence or that there were other victims there.
5
 
Because the government failed to satisfy its burden of proving that Evans had an 
objectively reasonable basis for his belief that other victims or threats were present in 
Wolfe‟s residence, the search he conducted ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.6  
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s suppression order. 
                                              
5
 Other cases the parties cite in their briefs are also distinguishable from this one 
on the same grounds.  See, e.g., Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 547 (concluding that exigent 
circumstances existed where officers responded to report that man was “going crazy” at 
residence, “found a household in considerable chaos,” and observed individual acting 
violently through window); Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406 (finding that exigency existed 
where officers responded to complaint at residence, heard altercation occurring inside 
residence, and observed violent acts through window); Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-99 
(finding exigent circumstances where officers received report that robber recently fled 
house). 
 
6
 The government has conceded that if Evans‟s search of 912 South Orianna Street 
was unconstitutional, Wolfe‟s subsequent statements at the police station are the fruit of 
the poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible.  We therefore need not address whether 
the District Court erred in granting Wolfe‟s motion to suppress those statements.  
